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Social capital, networks, and determinants 
of social capital
 O.E.D. definition of social capital:
 “The networks of relationships among people who live 
and work in a particular society, enabling that society to 
function effectively”
 A network is not social capital unless it leads to 
productive social outcomes
 We study a measure of local labor market 
networks we have developed in past work
 Local labor market networks, as we measure them, are 
productive (e.g., better job matches)
 We study what predicts/is associated with our  
measure of local labor market networks 
Terminology of “social capital”
 Structural social capital: association links and activities, whether 
in formal organizations or informal associations 
 Contrasts with behavioral (or cognitive) social capital: perceptions of 
support, reciprocity, trust, etc.
 Our network measure is a measure of social capital – informal 
associational links, and productive
 We view the measures we relate to network strength as  
potential determinants of social capital – i.e., the productive 
outcomes 
 Semantic issue (?): but guards against us calling “everything” that could 
connect people “social capital,” without knowing whether those 
connections are productive
 E.g., “ethnic homogeneity” per se isn’t social capital, but it can produce 
social capital 
Research question
 Our question: Are hypothesized determinants of 
social capital associated with stronger labor market 
networks?
 Measure of labor market networks developed and 
“validated” in our past work, which we interpret as 
social capital
 Past/new measures of determinants of social capital 
with rich data from many sources
 Machine learning to examine whether/which 
neighborhood social capital determinants are associated 
with stronger labor market networks
Methods/analysis
 Analysis is cross-sectional, between network measures and 
social capital determinants
 Not so concerned about reverse causation, but about omitted 
variables that drive both
 We have comprehensive data and controls, but that doesn’t rule out 
other common influences on both
 Why machine learning?
 Multiplicity of potential social capital measures that could help 
explain network variation
 Wanted to avoid: 
 Ex ante selection (unclear anyway) 
 Searching for significant predictors easiest to rationalize ex post as 
social capital measures
Schematic of measurement of networks 
(HMN, 2011)
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 Network isolation for worker i in tract c
 IC(i, j) = indicator for whether co-worker j of worker i also lives 
in the same residential neighborhood as i
 IE(i, j) = indicator for whether i and j work in the same 
establishment
 Sums taken over all workers except i



















 Some clustering of neighbors in establishments 
occurs randomly, in particular because people tend 
to work near where they live
 In HMN, we measure this directly, and adjust
 Measure clustering relative to “random clustering,” which we 
compute by distributing workers in a Census tract randomly to 
establishments in that Census tract
 Here we control for it in regression
 Condition on skill, which we do in earlier work by 
doing the random clustering conditional on skill
Other research establishes productivity of 
networks
 HKN (2014): robust finding that workers hired into jobs with 
greater network connections to co-residents have lower 
turnover (LEHD 2004-2007)
 True in highly-saturated models: e.g., worker characteristics, controls for 
“network” of neighbors at nearby employers, employer-year fixed effects, 
etc.
 Much evidence points to higher wages also, but less robust
 HKN (2019): labor market networks coupled with connections to 
hiring at neighbors’ employers speed re-employment after mass 
layoffs, and at better jobs  
Network measures in this paper: 
effective network isolation indexes
 Network isolation index constructed by averaging NIic over 
individuals in same tract, one computed over workers, and one 
over people
 Possible advantage of NICP: picks up effects on employment
 Possible disadvantage is more sensitivity to local labor market conditions
 We also construct tract-level analogues as controls – “transport 
isolation indexes”
 Clustering of neighbors by tract (not establishment), to pick up  
transportation infrastructure that could create illusion of clustering by 



































Data for measuring neighborhood labor 
market networks
 LEHD: workers (and neighbors) aged 18-64
 2010 data, to correspond to other data we use
 Home and workplace information for 110 million jobs 
at beginning of 2nd quarter (to match LEHD public-use 
products), and linked to other information on 
workers, past residences, etc. 
 About 34,000 (urban) tracts
Descriptive statistics: network measures 
(and related controls)
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
NIcW Observed tract average network 
isolation index, per worker 
1.609 1.113
TIcW Observed tract average transport 
isolation index, per worker
0.588 0.612
NIcP Observed tract average network 
isolation index, per resident
1.013 0.710
TIcP Observed tract average transport 
isolation index, per resident
0.373 0.393
 Magnitudes
 NICW = 1.609: on average, 1.6% of co-workers live in same tract
 Maximum is much less than 100%, because of sizes of firms where tract 
residents live
 TICW = 0.588: on average, 0.6% of those who work in same tract live in same 
tract
 Implication: clustering of neighbors by establishment is a good deal higher than 
what is predicted by location factors alone
Are determinants of social capital in a neighborhood 
associated w/ stronger labor market networks?
 Social capital determinants guided by previous literature
 Demographic features/homogeneity of neighborhoods associated with 
trust of others and society more generally (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2002)
 Schools: smaller, higher-income parents, and small classes, which may be 
associated with higher parental involvement in schools, interaction with 
neighbors, etc. (e.g., Gardner et al., 2000)
 Voting 
 Turnout (civic participation, e.g., Guiso et al., 2004)
 Conservative/liberal views: trust in different institutions (e.g., Putnam, 1994)
 Homogeneity
 New measures of civic institutions, religious organizations, and other non-
profits (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000; Rupasingha et al., 2006)
Social capital determinants from Census 
(examples)
 Census measures/controls
 Share owner-occupied housing; residential mobility
 Job access measure (ACS): share commuting < 10 minutes
 Share who commute alone (ACS)
 Could reflect social capital or geography of jobs
 Demographic and other homogeneity: HHI for racial/ethnic 
shares; and Gini coefficient for income
School-related social capital determinants
 From 2010 school district boundaries (U.S. Census 
Bureau School Boundary Map), Census tract maps, and 
data from Dept. of Education’s “Common Core”
 Average student/teacher ratio (predicted negative effect)
 Share on FRPL (predicted negative effect)
 Number of districts to which students in tract assigned
 Could reduce networking because tracts fragmented, or could 
increase it by reflecting small schools with more parental 
involvement
 First two could also reflect other factors associated with SES, 
but especially for NICW, which “conditions” on working, not 
clear why this would be correlated with network strength 
Voting measures
 2008 presidential voting results by 2010 tracts (from 
Harvard Election Data Archive)
 Fraction of voting age population that voted (predicted 
positive effect)
 Fraction that voted Democratic
 Prediction? Putnam (1994) suggests that conservatives may be more 
supportive of local, potentially more private associations that build 
structural social capital at the local level, whereas liberals might be 
less supportive out of a concern that current inequalities will be 
embedded in local social capital.
 Fraction of votes for candidate of party winning vote in tract 
(homogeneity, predicted positive effect)
New measures of non-profit sector
establishments of many types
 2013 NETS
 Longitudinal data on universe of establishments in United States, based 
on Dun & Bradstreet data
 More complete coverage of non-profits than LEHD
 Highly-detailed NAICS codes
 Detailed geographic information (geocoded or Census block or tract)
 Non-profit status not always reported well (50%), and some clear 
errors at individual level (e.g., specific churches verified from 
their website coded as for-profit)
 We use all NAICS 6-digit industries with 10% of non-missing cases coded 
as non-profits (85 total)
 We use counts of non-profit establishments, by 6-digit sector (chosen by 
machine learning)
 We add overall count of NETS establishments, so we estimate effect of 
composition
Estab’s in non-profit sector can produce social 
capital in different ways
 Public goods/community functions (e.g., neighborhood 
associations; Neighborhood Watch)
 Social interactions (e.g., athletic clubs)
 Both (Kiwanis culbs)
 Evidence from machine learning algorithm can help establish 
whether stronger labor market networks are associated with 
public goods provisions (“estab’s” that strengthen neighbhood
ties), or social interactions (e.g., country clubs)
 But not always easy to distinguish
“Non-profit” social capital examples (I)







813410 Alumni associations; Alumni clubs; Automobile clubs (except road 
and travel services); Book discussion clubs; Booster clubs; Boy 
guiding organizations; Civic associations; Classic car clubs; Computer 
enthusiasts clubs; Ethnic associations; Farm granges; Fraternal 
associations or lodges, social or civic; Fraternal lodges; Fraternal 
organizations; Fraternities (except residential); Garden clubs; Girl 
guiding organizations; Golden age clubs; Granges; Historical clubs; 
Membership associations, civic or social; Parent-teachers' 
associations; Poetry clubs; Public speaking improvement clubs; 
Retirement associations, social; Scouting organizations; Senior 
citizens' associations, social; Singing societies; Social clubs; Social 
organizations, civic and fraternal; Sororities (except residential); 
Speakers' clubs; Student clubs; Students' associations; Students' 
unions; University clubs; Veterans'  membership organizations; 
Women's auxiliaries; Women's clubs; Writing clubs; Youth civic 
clubs; Youth clubs (except recreational only); Youth farming 
organizations; Youth scouting organizations; Youth social clubs
14839 44974 33.0
“Non-profit” social capital examples (II)







813110 Bible societies; Churches; Convents (except schools); Missions, 
religious organization; Monasteries (except schools); Mosques, 
religious; Places of worship; Religious organizations; Retreat houses, 
religious; Shrines, religious; Synagogues; Temples, religious
73178 228934 32.0%
813930 Employees’ associations for improvement of wages and working 
conditions; Federation of workers, labor organizations; Federations of 
labor; Industrial labor unions; Labor federations; Labor unions (except 
apprenticeship programs); Trade unions (except apprenticeship 
programs); Trade unions, local; Unions (except apprenticeship 
programs), labor
2892 11966 24.2%
713910 Country clubs; Golf and country clubs; Golf courses (except miniature, 
pitch-n-putt)
2682 12361 21.7%
Machine learning to select social 
capital “predictors” of networks
 Estimation from objective function (Belloni et al., 2014): 
 Used when researchers don’t have strong priors on which variables 
matter, many possible predictors (even more than sample size), and 
there is risk of “over-fitting”
 “Shrinks” coefficients, with some going to zero, to keep number of 
predictors small
 First term is OLS objective function
 Second term is penalty function 
 λ overall, and γl applied to each covariate
 Values chosen by LASSO algorithm to choose best predictors, based on cross-
validation, which can be thought of incorporating the accuracy of out of sample 
prediction into the estimation
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OLS and LASSO results (examples/highlights): commuting 
and neighborhood variables (full controls and state FE’s)
 Driving alone: less networked
 Less residential mobility: more networked
 Racially/ethnically homogeneous: more networked
NIcW NIcP
OLS LASSO OLS LASSO
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Commute < 10 minutes 0.788*** 0.768† 0.435*** 0.388†
(0.076) (0.056) (0.042) (0.033)
Commute by driving alone -0.443*** -0.474† -0.150*** -0.192†
(0.066) (0.037) (0.036) (0.022)
Share did not move 0.321*** 0.305† 0.208*** 0.229†
in last year (0.066) (0.052) (0.039) (0.030)
Share housing 0.318*** 0.324† 0.201*** 0.199†
owner-occupied (0.040) (0.027) (0.023) (0.016)
Population (1,000s)/ -0.012*** -0.012† -0.007*** -0.006†
sq. mile (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004)
Gini coefficient of 1.78*** 1.67† 1.01*** 0.954†
household income (0.083) (0.065) (0.048) (0.039)
Race/ethnicity Herfindahl- 0.235*** 0.248† 0.191 0.188†
Hirschmann index (0.043) (0.033) (0.026) (0.021)
Observed tract average 1.280*** 1.27† 1.26*** 1.25†
transport isolation index, per worker (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
Count of NETS estab’s (100s) 0.051*** 0.062† 0.030*** 0.042†
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
OLS and LASSO results: prior social capital variables 
(full controls and state FE’s)
 Signs of significant estimates mostly consistent with expectations (retained variables 
highlighted)
 More districts: more networked (suggests smaller districts plays role)
 Higher turnout: more networked
 Higher Democratic vote share: less networked
NIcW NIcP
OLS LASSO with full controls + state FEs OLS LASSO with full controls + state FEs
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of districts 0.048*** 0.046† 0.029*** 0.028†
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Average number of tracts -0.002 -0.003 -0.0005
in school district(s) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Student/teacher ratio 0.0004 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Free/reduced-price -0.034 -0.073*** -0.060†
lunch share (0.025) (0.015) (0.012)
Majority vote share 0.116* 0.061*
(0.060) (0.034)
Democratic vote share -0.819*** -0.746† -0.575*** -0.453†
(0.055) (0.037) (0.031) (0.019)
Voter turnout 0.0005 0.046† 0.013 0.028†
(0.021) (0.005) (0.013) (0.003)
LASSO results: non-profit social capital variables 
(consistent positive effects on network measures) –
out of 90 NAICS codes in non-profit sector
NAICS Examples
525120 Union health and welfare funds
611110 Elementary and secondary schools; Junior high schools
621910 Ambulance services, air or ground; Rescue services, medical
622310 Children’s hospitals, specialty
711130 Chamber musical groups
713910 Country clubs; Golf courses (except miniature, pitch-n-putt)
721214 Children’s camps
813110 Churches; Mosques; Synagogues
813211 Charitable trusts; Community foundations
813410 Civic associations; Fraternal organizations; Fraternities (except residential); Parent-teachers’ 
associations; Scouting organizations
813930 Labor unions
921110 Advisory commissions; City and town managers’ offices; Mayor’s offices
922120 Housing police; Park police; Police departments
922160 Fire and rescue service; Firefighting, government and volunteer 
Industries are included in this table if all of the estimated LASSO coefficients across different specifications were 
positive, and at least three (out of six) were statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
Results for non-profits (I)
 Many seem like natural or even stereotypical types of estab’s 
that would foster social capital
 Hobby clubs, civic associations, Scouts, PTAs, etc. (NAICS code 813410)
 Churches, mosques, etc. (813110)
 Fire and rescue services, including volunteer fire departments (922160)
 Schools (611110)
 Country clubs and golf courses (713910)
 Likely to encourage contacts between neighbors, and perhaps 
also those who work in similar types of jobs (country clubs, 
churches, schools may be segregated by SES)
Results for non-profits (II)
 Others may foster social capital, but perhaps not via contacts 
among neighbors
 Police departments (NAICS code 922120)
 City and mayors’ office (NAICS code 921110); could reflect 
decentralization
 Hospitals (NAICS code 622310)
 Not really any with positive effects that don’t seem to fit one 
of these interpretations
 Some negative effects (same criteria) are hard to interpret 
(e.g., social science research and development services (NAICS 
code 541720); apprenticeship training programs (NAICS code 
611513); homeowners’ associations (NAICS code 813990))
 But wouldn’t have expected positive effects, arguably, and estimated 
effects much smaller
Magnitudes are sizable, comparable to 
traditional social capital determinants
 Examples – non-profit sector: 
 NAICS 813410 (hobby clubs, scouts, PTAs): 1 SD increase in non-profit 
sector count increases NIcW by 2.4%
 NAICS 813110 (churches, mosques, synagogues): 1 SD increase in non-
profit sector count increases NIcW by 6.7%
 NAICS 813410 (country clubs and golf courses): 1 SD change in non-
profit sector count increases NIcW by 2.9%
 Comparable or larger than for many of the “traditional” variables in the 
social capital literature (especially aggregating across multiple NAICS 
codes)
Conclusions
 We find surprisingly (?) consistent evidence that social capital measures 
are positively associated with measures of the strength of labor market 
networks at the Census tract level
 True for variables tied to past work/writing on social capital
 Smaller, more decentralized, less poor schools
 Higher Republican votes share 
 True for our new measures of non-profit-sector estab’s, which we view as 
measuring density of institutions that facilitate social capital, such as 





 For many, evidence consistent with non-profits that facilitate social capital in 
the form of labor market network connections among neighbors
